State of Utah v. Raymond Joe Vigil : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
State of Utah v. Raymond Joe Vigil : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brooke C. Wells; Attorney for Appellant;
David WIlkinson; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Vigil, No. 18118 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2750
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RAYMOND JOE VIGIL, 
Def end ant-Appellant·. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Case No. 18118 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from convictions of Aggravated Robbery and 
Attempted Criminal Homicide in the Third lJudicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South 200 Rast 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
NOV 18 1982 
..., .. ----···----···-- ,. ........ ,,, ........................ .., 
Cl~r'.i. St!promo Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RAYMOND JOE VIGIL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
• . 
. 
. 
• . 
• 
• 
• . 
Case No. 18118 
BRIEF OF RESPONOBNT 
A~peal from convictions of Aggravaten Robbery and 
Attempted Criminal Homicide in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
·Honorable Peter F. Leary, Ju~ge, presiding. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Salt Lake Legal Defenoer Assoc. 
333 south 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney ~eneral 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
23n State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Responoent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATTJRE OF THE CASE • 
• • • • • • • • • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURI~G CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS ON THE GUILTY PLEA OF A DEFENSE 
WITNESS WERE RESTRICTED TO THE EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL AND WERE NOT IMPROPER • • • 
CONCLUSION. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Cases Cited 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
15 
Fitzgerald v. State, 219 P.2d 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950) 12 
Hotel Riviera Inc. v. Short, 396 P.2d 855 (Nev. 1964). 12 
Lewis v. State, 569 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1977) • • • • • • • 9,10 
People v. Hamilton, 383 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1963). • • • • • 12 
People v. Houghton, 212 Cal. App. 2d 864, 28 Cal. Rptr. 
People 
People 
Riddle 
Sequin 
351 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) •••••••• 
v. Poe, 182 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) •• 
v. Wright, 232 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) 
v. State, 363 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). 
v. Hauser Motor Co., 350 So.2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. 
12 
14 
12 
14 
Ct. App. 1977). • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14 
State 
State 
State 
State 
State 
v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2Q 530 (1973). 10,14 
v. Braathen, 43 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1950). • • • • • 14 
v. Byrd, 453 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1969). • • • • • • • • 12 
v. Gaxiola, Utah, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976) •••••• 10,11 
v. Hales, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 18083, 
decided July 7, 1982) •••••••••••• 
State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450 (1978) ••••••• 
State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949 (1975) ••••••• 
State v. Patterson, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 17610, 
10 
9 
10 
decided November 5, 1982) • • • • • • • • • • 14 
State v. Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) • • 14 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) •• 10,11 
United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974) •• 
United States v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 1975). 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-203 (1953), as amended ••••• 
" " n § 76-6-302 " " " - - - - -
14 
12 
12 
1 , 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
Plaintiff-Respondent, • • 
-v- . Case No. 18118 • 
RAYMOND JOE VIGIL, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a 
first-degree.felony,- in violation of.Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-
302 ( 1953), as amenfled, and attempted criminal homicide, a 
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-
203 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
guilty on both charges on October 21, 1981 in the Third 
Judi·cia~ District, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
Appellant was sentenced O~tober 21, 1981 to an indeterminate 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison for the 
aggravated robbery conviction, and to an indeterminate term of 
not less than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison for the attempted criminal homicide conviction. 
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Each of these sentences is to run concurrently with the 
sentence the appellant is presently serving. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's 
convictions and sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 26, 1981, a Pinto car owned by Tracy Neely 
from Idaho, who was visiting appellant, was observed at about 
1 a.m. at a Winchell's Donut Shop at 1465 South State Street 
in Salt Lake City (T. 43). Two male Mexican-Americans with 
stocking masks over their heads entered the donut shop (T. 
43). Robert Sherwood and George Bowie were discussing a 
fishing trip at a nearby motel; they recognized the probable 
criminal activity and telephoned the police (T. 43-44). 
The masked men, one of whom was carrying a firearm, 
went behind the counter inside the donut shop, held the gun in 
the baker's face and ordered the baker to open the cash 
register (T. 5). The baker was hit in the mouth with a fist 
before he was able to open the cash register, after which he 
was told to lie on the floor with his face down (T. 5). The 
men took $136 out of the cash register (T. 6), left the store, 
nran to a corner street, made a right turn ano disappeared" 
(T. 44). 
-2-
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Rick Lewis, a police officer, was patrolling in a 
marked patrol car near the area of the donut shop and received 
information from a police dispatcher that the robbery suspects 
were driving a yellow Pinto car (T. 51). The officer noticed 
a Pinto car matching the description as he approached a stop 
·light at the intersection of 1700 South and State Street (T. 
52). He followed the Pinto car as it headed west, radioed for 
assistance (T. 52), and followed the Pinto car as it turned 
north onto Jefferson Street, which became a dead end street 
after a short distance (T. 53). The officer activated the 
patrol car's overhea~ lights and the Pinto car stopped (T. 
55) •. Another .. police officer, Terry Opheikens, arrived in 
another patrol car and stopped adjacent to Office Lewis' car 
(T. 56). 
Using the patrol car's public address system, 
Officer Lewis instructed the Pinto car's occupants to roll 
down the car's windows and extend their hands into Lewis' view 
(T. 56). The passenger on the right side of the car attempted 
to get out of the Pinto, but Lewis told him to remain inside, 
after which the Pinto's engine was started and the car 
accelerated· down the street (T. 57). The officers pursued 
with their vehicles; they noticed that the Pinto had reached 
the dead end, had turned around, and was headed toward them; 
and the officers set up a roadblock with the patrol cars (T. 
58-59). As the Pinto approached the roadblock, a firearm 
-3-
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from the passenger-side window was pointed at Lewis, who drew 
his revolver and fired six shots at the Pinto (T. 60). 
Several shots were fired at Lewis from the Pinto car (T. 61). 
Because of the distance between Lewis' and 
Opheikens' cars, the Pinto broke through the roadblock after 
striking Opheikens' patrol car (T. 61). The Pinto proceeded 
down the street a short distance before stopping, with the 
three occupants exiting and running onto the driveway of a 
private residence (T. 62). A search of the area uncovered the 
appellant, who was hiding under aluminum sheet metal near a 
garage in the back yard of a private residence (T. 65). Leo 
and Rudy Duran were found in a nearby field, lying face down 
on top of a shaving kit which contained two money envelopes 
with about $135, a pair of panty hose with one of the legs cut 
off and a pair of gloves (T. 143-146). A revolver with four 
empty cartridges was also found in shrubbery by a fence in the 
backyard of the residence near where appellant was hiding (T. 
123). 
Leo ann Rudy Duran pled guilty to attempted criminal 
homicide, and were sentenced to indeterminate terms of not 
less than one year and not more than 15 years at the Utah 
State Prison. Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of 
attempted criminal homicide and aggravated robbery, 
convictions from which he now appeals. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS ON THE GUILTY PLEA OF A DEFENSE 
WITNESS WERE RESTRICTED TO THE EVIDENCE 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL AND WERE NOT IMPROPER. 
The appellant does not argue insufficiency or other 
defects in the evidence producen against him at trial. His 
only claim concerns the closing arguments made by the 
prosecutor and the limits imposed by the trial judge on the 
closing arguments of appellant's counsel. Appellant's claim 
focuses on the testimony of defense witness Leo Duran. 
After the prosecution had presented its case in 
chief, the defense callen Leo Duran as a witness. During 
direct examination by defense counsel, Duran testified as 
.follows: 
Ms. Wells: Leo, have you recently entered 
a plea of guilty to any charges having to 
do with the charges that are now facing 
Mr. Vigil? 
Leo Duran: Yes. 
Ms. Wells: What have you enterea a plea 
of guilty to? 
Leo Duran: Attempted criminal homicide. 
Ms. Wells: Was that a result of any plea 
negotiations with the State? 
Leo Duran: Yes. 
Ms. Wells: What else were you charged 
with? 
-5-
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(T. 
Leo Duran: Aggravated robbery. 
Ms. Wells: And what happened when you 
entered a plea of guilty to the attempted 
criminal homicide? What happened to the 
other case? 
Leo Duran: They dropped it. 
Ms. Wells: Have you been sentenced on 
that matter yet? 
Leo Duran: Yes. 
Ms. Wells: What sentence did you receive? 
Leo Duran: I received a l-to-15. 
Ms. Wells: What does that mean? 
Leo Duran: I will be sent to the prison 
to do my time. 
Ms. Wells: Are you presently in custody 
awaiting transference to the prison? 
Leo Duran: Yes. 
Ms. Wells: Now, Leo, other than an 
attempted criminal homicide which you have 
just spoken about, have you been convicted 
of any other felony offenses? 
Leo Duran: In the past? 
Ms. Wells: Yes, in the past. 
Leo Duran: Yes. 
Ms. Wells: What was that? As an adult. 
Leo Duran: Attempted aggravated burglary. 
Ms. Wells: When was that? 
Leo Duran: Five-six years ago. 
152-153). 
-6-
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Duran testified that he and Rudy Duran, Leo's 
brother who also pled guilty to attempted criminal hornicioe, 
hao robbed the Winchell's Donut Shop (T. 155-158), and 
afterwards .they returned to a party where appellant was (T. 
158). Duran further stated that he, Rudy and appellant then 
decided· to· ~isit a friend in a hospital (T. 158-159). While 
driving to the hospital, Duran said a police officer stopped 
them (T. 160). On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Leo 
Duran admitted that his testimony was the first time he had 
told anyone about this version of the events on July 26, 1981 
(T. 177). 
After the prosecution and defense had presented 
their evidence, the prosecutor made his closing arguments. 
During the defense counsel's closing argument, she commented 
on the plea bargains of Rudy and Leo Duran. Defense counsel 
stated: 
Now, we know that an aggravated robbery 
occurred. We know th~~ two persons 
committed that aggravated robbery. Yet, 
we also know that Mr. Leo Duran did not 
plead guilty to the crime of agqravated 
robbery. 
(T. 199-200). The prosecutor objected to these comments. The 
trial court··sustained the objection and admonished the jury to 
disregard the comments (T. 200). 
Durinq rebuttal to the defense attorney's closing 
arguments, prosecutor Mr. Jones stated: 
-7-
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Finally, ask yourselves this question: If 
there was no attempten homicide in this 
case, no evidence of an attempted 
homicide, why is it that Leo Duran walked 
into court yesterday and took the stand 
and told you--
( At this point, defense counsel objected 
but the trial judge asked the prosecutor 
to continue. ) 
Why is it that Mr. Duran took the stand in 
this case and told you that he pled guilty 
to that offense of an attempted homicide? 
That fact should inidicate to you that 
there was an attempted homicide in this 
case. It is absolutely contrary to 
defense counsel's argument. 
( T. 218-219) • 
After the jury left the room, defense counsel moved 
to dismiss, stating: 
• • • in that during my closing argument 
my attempt to explain the position of Leo 
and Rudy Duran • • • my comments were 
objected to and the Court sustained that 
objection. I immediately desisted from 
that. 
However, Mr. Jones [the prosecutor] 
in his argument did make comment with 
regard to the plea bargain and Mr. Duran's 
having plea guilty to an offense and that 
he pled guilty to it because he was guilty 
of it. I believe that was in error and 
highly prejudicial, and if nothing more he 
should not have been allowed to proceed. 
The trial court denied the motion (T. 221). 
Appellant attempts to characterize the closing 
arguments of the prosecutor on the Duran brothers' guilty 
pleas as similar to the closing arguments made by the 
appellant's attorney. Because the judge allowed the closing 
arguments of the prosecutor, appellant claims that it was 
-8-
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then prejudicial to limit the defense attorney's arguments on 
Leo and Rudy Duran's guilty pleas. 
A review of the prosecutor's closing arguments on 
the guilty pleas reveals that he was simply restating to the 
jury the testimony of Leo Duran. Mr. Duran, a defense 
witness, stated on direct examination that he had pled guilty 
to attempted criminal homicide, a charge arising out of the 
same circumstances that were facing appellant (T. 152). The 
prosecutor in closing argument said that Leo Duran pled guilty 
to attempted criminal homicide, which indicated that there was 
an attempted criminal homicide. Pleading guilty to a crime is 
equivalent to admitting that Duran committed the crime; he had 
admitted facts that supported the crime charged. State v. 
Harris, _Utah, 585 P.2d 450 (1978). 
Appellant cites Lewis v. State, 569 P.2d 486 (Okla. 
1977) for the proposition that the prosecutor could not tell 
the jury that a guilty plea means admitting the facts without 
also telling the jury "the ramifications of the Durans' 
respective pleas" (appellant's brief, p. 8). The Lewis case 
is clearly distinguishable from the present case because Lewis 
involved improper closing arguments by the prosecutor who gave 
his opinion on the guilt of defendant before defendant's guilt 
had been decided by repeatedly stating the defendant had lied. 
In the present case, the prosecutor did not give his opinion 
-9-
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of appellant's guilt and the guilt of Leo Duran had been 
previously decideo. Leo Duran's guilt was no longer at issue, 
as was that of the defendants in Lewis v. State, supra. 
It is the prerogative and the duty of either counsel 
to analyze all aspects of the evidence and to make any 
pertinent statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is not and what it 
does or does not show. State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949 
(1975). A prosecutor has the duty and right to argue the case 
based on the total picture shown by the evidence or the lack 
thereof. State v. Hales, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 
18083, decided July 7, 1982); State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 
112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973). Counsel for both sides have 
considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury, and have 
the right to discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence, inferences and deductions arising therefrom. State 
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973); State v. 
_,/' 
Gaxiola, Utah, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976). The Utah Supreme Court 
in Valdez, at 426, stated: 
The test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. The 
-10-
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determination of whether the improper 
remarks have influenced a verdict is 
within the sound discretion of the trial 
court on motion for a new trial. If there 
be no abuse of this discretion and 
substantial justice appears to have been 
done, the appellate court will not reverse 
the judgment. 
Under the Valdez test, it is clear that the 
prosecutor did not call to the attention of the jurors in the 
instant case matters which thev would not be justified in 
~ 
considering to determine the appellant's guilt. The 
prosecutor made a common sense observation of fact that the 
jurors could not fail to notice: that Leo Duran pled guilty 
to attempted criminal homicide and that the crime actually did 
occur. The prosecutor did not say or insinuate that the 
statement was·based on personal knowledge or on anything other 
than Leo Duran's testimony given before the jury. The 
prosecutor did not indicate his opinion of the appellant's 
guilt. 
A review of defense counsel's arguments shows that 
she committed error, not the prosecutor. Appellant cites 
Valdez and ~axiola, both supra, for the proposition that both 
sides can argue the evidence, and inferences and deductions 
arising therefrom. This is a correct statement of the Utah 
case law; however, the defense attorney was not discussing the 
evidence, inferences or deductions. Defense counsel was 
attempting to introduce new evidence, to wit: reasons for the 
nurans' guilty pleas. 
-11-
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Plea discussions and plea agreements are not 
admissible either for or against the appellant in any judicial 
proceeding. United States v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir. 
1975); United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974); 
State v. Byrd, 453 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1969); People v. Hamilton, 
383 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1963). Admitting plea discussions into 
evidence would in effect defeat the purpose of plea barg~ins. 
Using plea bargaining statements in later proceedings will 
discourage people charged with crimes from entering guilty 
pleas when plea negotiations could be used against them in 
later proceedings. Defense counsel in this case attempted to 
introduce evidence of plea bargaining, which is improper. The 
trial judge correctly prevented defense counsel from 
introducing the reasons for the Durans' guilty pleas. 
In addition, there was no evidence at trial for the 
reasons the Durans pled guilty. An attempt to introduce 
statements by defense counsel about the guilty pleas 
constitutes unsworn testimony. Comments by counsel which are 
outside the record and therefore not based on the testimony 
and issues of the trial are generally regarded as unsworn 
testimony and improper. Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Short, 396 
P.2d 855 (Nev. 1964); Fitzgerald v. State, 219 P.2d 1024 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1950); People v. Houqhton, 212 Cal. App. 2d 
864, 28 Cal. Rptr. 351 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. 
Wright, 232 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962). 
-12-
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In the instant case defense counsel was attempting 
to testify to matters not in evidence rather than anvocating 
her client's cause. If the defense attorney would have wanted 
to testify as a witness, she should have been sworn and have 
given the prosecutor an opportunity to cross-examine her. The 
defehse attorney was properly prevented by the trial judge 
from commenting on matters not testified to at the trial. 
Defense counsel's closing arguments and attempts to 
comment on plea bargaining of Leo and Rudy Duran are also 
improper because the comments attempt to vouch for the 
credibility of Leo Duran. The intronuction of unsworn matters 
during closing arguments is an attempt to bolster Leo Duran's 
testimony. These attempts to bolster the testimony of Leo 
Duran were.calculated to induce the jurors to believe that the 
defense attorney knew Leo Duran's reputation for truth and was 
therefore entitled to absolute credence about everything Leo 
Duran said. 
Defense counsel attempts to bolster the credibility 
of Leo Duran by proffering reasons why Duran had pled guilty 
other than that a crime had occurred. Defense counsel has a 
right .to.··argue ·the credibility of a witness when counsel 
confines that argument to.the evidence and fair inferences 
that arise therefrom, but defense counsel has no right to 
search beyond the record and state extraneous facts either in 
support or in derogation of a witness' credibility. State v. 
-13-
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Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Poe, 183 
N.W.2d 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Rraathen 1 43 N.W.2d 
202 (N.D. 1950); Sequin v. Hauser Motor Co., 350 So.2d 1089 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Rinnle v. state, 363 s.w.2a 264 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1963). 
Moreover, the determination whether improper 
remarks, if any, of counsel during arguments to the jury have 
influenced a verdict lies within the discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 
(1973). If there is no abuse of discretion and substantial 
justice appears to have been done, the appellate court will 
not reverse the judgment. State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 
P.2d 422 (1973). Appellant in this case has not shown that he 
was prejudiced. Appellant speculates why the Durans pled 
guilty, none of the speculations being in evidence at trial. 
More importantly, appellant has not shown that these 
speculations on a witness' guilty plea would have influenced 
the jury's mind as to the guilt of appellant. The issue at 
trial was whether appellant was guilty, not whether a witness 
could plead guilty for reasons other than that the witness 
committed the crime. 
There was no prejudice to appellant in this case. 
The evidence was clear and decisive, and the trial court's 
judgment should be upheld, notwithstanding any alleged 
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor or the trial judge. 
Se~ State v. Patterson, Utah, P.2d (Case No. 17610, 
decided November 5, 1982). 
-14-
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A Winchell's Donut Shop was robbed at about l a.m., 
with several witnesses testifying to the details of the 
robbery and the robbers' car. Shortly thereafter, police 
officers attempted to stop a car matching the description of 
the robbers' get-away vehicle. The three occupants, appellant 
and Leo and Rudy Duran, resisted the arrest and fired several 
shots from a revolver as the car broke through the police 
officers' roadblock. The three occupants of the car were 
found near the abandoned car. 
The evidence in this case is overwhelming. The 
jury's verdict was not affected by the trial court's refusal 
to allow the defense attorney to comment during closing 
arguments on a witness' guilty plea. The jury was not misled 
thereby into doing something it would not otherwise have done. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutor's closing arguments were properly 
limited to the evidence admitted at trial. Defense counsel, 
however, attempts to show prejudice to appellant because 
defense counsel was not allowed to comment on Leo Duran's 
guilty plea during closing argument. The trial judge did not 
commit reversible error because defense counsel was attempting 
to introduce new evidence. Plea negotiations, which defense 
counsel attempted to argue in her closing statement, cannot be 
admitted at trial. Defense counsel also cannot bolster the 
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testimony of witnesses during closing argument Furthermore, 
because the evidence is· overwhelming in this case, appellant 
has not shown that there was prejudice in limiting defense 
counsel's closing argument or that the jury would have been 
influenced otherwise. 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the 
convictions and sentences of appellant be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this }~tJ:i.. day of November, 
1982. 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Brooke C. 
Wells, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 
/2 day of November, 1982. 
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